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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
Of
Case No. 900533
JOHN BEN MAXFIELD,
PRIORITY OF ARGUMENT (16)
Deceased.
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, §78-2-2(3) (J) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether joint accounts belong during the lifetime of the

joint depositors in proportion to the net contribution by each as
required by Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, §75-6-103(1)?

The

review of questions of statutory construction is plenary.
Antillon v. Department of Employment S e c , 688 P.2d 455 (Utah
1984) .
2.

Whether the act of one joint depositor in wrongfully

withdrawing all funds on deposit, assaulting thereby the interest
of the other joint depositor, destroys the joint tenancy and

- 1 -
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extinguishes the right of survivorship? In equity cases appellants
may appeal on facts as well as law.

Adams v. Gubler, 731 P.2d

494 (Utah 1986) .
3.

Whether property brought into marriage loses its

character as separate property and becomes marital property by its
being placed in joint tenancy with the non-contributing spouse
through various sales and purchases?

This legal conclusion of the

trial court is accorded no particular deference and is subject to
review by Supreme Court for correctness.

Kelson v. Salt Lake

County, 784 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1989).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
75-6-103* Ownership during lifetime.-(1) A joint account
belongs, during the lifetime of all parties, to the parties in
proportion to the net contributions by each to the sums on
deposit, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a
different intent.
75-2-202. Augmented estate •-(2) (a) For purposes of subsection
75-2-201(1), "Marital property" means all values included in the
augmented estate relating to property acquired by the decedent
subsequent to the most recent marriage to the surviving spouse
except: (i) property acquired by gift, devise, or descent; (ii)

- 2-
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i

i

property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the
most recent marriage to the surviving spouse or in exchange for
property acquired by gift, devise, or descent; and (i i i) the
increase, rents, issues and profits on property acquired prior to
the most recent marriage to the surviving spouse, and on property
described in (i) and (ii).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final order and findings of fact and
conclusions of law in proceedings for probate of a will and
determination of marital property, entered in the District Court
of Weber County, State of Utah, October 11, 1990, by the Honorable
Ronald 0. Hyde for the Honorable David E. Roth, ruling as a matter
of law that separate property brought into marriage by the husband
lost its character as separate property and became marital
property by being placed in joint tenancy during the marriage
through various sales and purchases and that each spouse was
deemed to have contributed one-half to the jointly owned property.
(Addenda 1 and 2 hereto attached) • Appellants seek to have the
trial court's order reversed and all clearly established
premarital property of John Ben Maxfield and the increase thereto

- 3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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restored to his personal representatives for distribution pursuant
to his valid last will and testament.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The deceased John Ben Maxfield ("Ben") , a retired real estate
developer, farmer and former firechief of the U.S. Naval Supply
Base at Clearfield, Utah, deposited all his earnings and life
savings to various Ogden Bank of Utah accounts (Tr. 29), which
included a joint checking account, a joint savings account and
five joint certificates of deposit, totaling $273,833.60 as of
November 25, 1986.

The joint accounts had been established as

follows:
Account Number

Joint Owners

Checking Account
121 477 4
Savings Account
0109-8233
CD 30247

J. B. Maxfield or
Louise A. Maxfield
J. B. Maxfield or
Louise A. Maxfield
J. B. Maxfield or
Louise A. Maxfield or
joy Thornock

$ 14,178.18

CD 32104

Louise A. Maxfield or
J. B. Maxfield or
Stanton LeSieur

72,489.02

- 4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Amount

10,372.71
66,677.21

CD 32911

Louise A. Maxfield or
J. B. Maxfield or
Joy Thornock

9,097.11

CD 34244

J. B. Maxfield or
Louise A. Maxfield or
Ben J. Maxfield

63,215.00

CD 34245

J. B. Maxfield or
Louise A. Maxfield

37,804.37

TOTAL

$273,833.60

Although the registration of most of the joint accounts included
names additional to J. B. Maxfield and Louise A, Maxfield, there
is no evidence that any party other than J. B. Maxfield and Louise
A. Maxfield ever contributed funds to the said accounts.
Cross-appellantf Ben's second wife, Louise A, Maxfield
("Louise"), maintained several additional savings accounts,
separate from those with Ben which were jointly owned by her and
her children by a previous marriage, i.e., Stanton LeSieur, Karen
Wall and Alice Coffman.

(Exhibits 38d, 40d and 41d).

One such

certificate for $12,000.00 was alleged to be an inheritance from
her aunt. (Tr. 77-78, 118). She also kept her social security
benefit payments separate from the joint accounts with her
husband.

(Tr. 71). The only separate funds of Louise ever

deposited to joint accounts with Ben were her take-home pay which
didn't amount to $9,500 during the marriage.
18d).

(Tr. 16 and Exhibit

On November 25, 1986, pursuant to her attorney's

recommendation, Louise withdrew all funds jointly owned with Ben
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from the five Bank of Utah certificates totaling $249,282.71, and
after incurring several thousand dollars in early withdrawal
penalties, she redeposited $245,235.12 of said funds in six new
certificates, five of which were registered in Louise's name
payable on her death as follows:
Certificate No:

POD Designation

Amount

52164

Joy Thornock
(Ben's daughter)

52226

Ben J. Maxfield
(Ben's son)

30,000.00

52175

Stanton LeSieur
(Louise's son)

30,000.00

52227

Alice Coffman
(Louise's daughter)

30,000.00

52228

Karen Wall
(Louise's daughter)

30,000.00

$30,000.00

The remaining $95,235.12 of the withdrawn joint funds were placed
in a joint account with Louise and her three children as joint
owners. (Exhibit 28d).
On December 1, 1986, the remaining funds owned jointly with
Ben, savings and checking accounts totaling $24,550.89, were
closed out by Louise, and the funds thereof transferred to new
checking and savings accounts jointly owned by Louise and her
daughter Karen Wall (Exhibits 29d, 30d and 39d), leaving Ben
totally bereft of any money whatsoever.

- 6-
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withdrawal of the last funds, Louise executed a will, prepared by
the attorney who recommended the withdrawals, which left her
entire estate to her children with no provision for her husband.
(Exhibit 42d).
After the discovery by Ben of the loss of his funds and the
commencement on his behalf of litigation for recovery of the
funds, Louise's attorney had her execute on February 13, 1987, a
trust agreement, ostensibly for the protection of both Ben and
Louise, but directing the trustee "...to pay upon her direction or
the direction of her attorney in fact any and all sums requested
by Mrs. Maxfield."

Also, unless otherwise directed, "...the

trust income, rents, issues and profits arising from this
trust..." were to be paid to Louise.

(Exhibit lp).

The trust

agreement was revoked by stipulation and court order dated May 18,
1987, and all funds withdrawn by Louise were ordered to "...be
deposited with Bank of Utah as special conservator of the Estate
of John B. Maxfield."

Distributions by the special conservator

were to be made for the reasonable "living expenses of John B.
Maxfield and Louise A. Maxfield." (Addendum 3 hereto attached and
Exhibit 2p). That stipulation and court order also provided that
the three legal proceedings, spawned by Louise's wrongful
withdrawal of the joint accounts, i.e., for appointment of a
conservator, for conversion of Ben's funds and for divorce, were

- 7 -
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all merged by said court order into the divorce proceeding which
was ultimately dismissed January 25, 1989, because of the physical
disability of Ben to testify. (Exhibits 2p and 3p).

Ben died

December 3, 1989, at the age of 79 years. (Exhibit 48d).
Simultaneously with the commencement of the divorce action
Ben executed an inter vivos trust and pour-over will which
provided for the payment of $600.00 per month to his wife Louise
for her lifetime (Exhibit 43d), a monthly sum roughly equivalent
to his combined retirement and social security benefits, to
portions of which Louise would also be entitled at Ben's death.
These documents were executed March 26, 1987, four months after
Louise's withdrawal of his funds, and they were never modified or
revoked.

In other words, Ben provided that Louise would receive

after his death $600.00 per month from his trust in addition to
the residuals of his federal employee's annuity and social
security payments.
As part of Louise's resistance to Ben's divorce action, she
required a mental evaluation of Benf claiming that he had
"deterioration of the brain"; however, the examining physician
found Ben competent to make a will and to prosecute his divorce
action. (Tr. 97).

During the examination Ben asserted to the

physician his reason for the divorce action, "[M]y wife took all
my money." (Tr. 58-62 and Exhibit 4p).

- 8-
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At the time of their marriage, September 7, 1961, Louise's
assets included a small residence, $1,200.00 and an annual income
of less than $1,000.00 from which she was supporting herself and
two minor daughters. (Tr. 9, 21 and Exhibit 18d-1961 1040).

On

the other hand, Ben's premarital assets included three houses in
Harrisville, a fifty acre farm, fifty percent of the stock in
Hisfield Gravel Company, a seller's escrow and multiple building
lots.

All these assets were debt-free when he married Louise.

(Tr. 127) .
His gross cash receipts in the year of their marriage
included $3,600.00 in salary from Hisfield, escrow payments of
$1,094.76 and $2,500.00 from the sale of a building lot, totaling
$6,378.91, much of which was sheltered from income tax by business
and farm expenses. (Exhibit 18d-1961 1040).

The disparity in

income of the spouses simply magnified during the 25 years prior
to their separation which occurred four days after Louise closed
out the joint accounts.

Louise's W-2 Forms reveal income for

only eleven years of the marriage, her highest annual income being
$1,535.69 in 1963, her lowest being $499.20 in 1969 and her annual
average for the eleven year period being less than $1,000.00.
Her total take-home pay during the entire marriage didn't total
$9,500.00. (Exhibit 18d).

- 9-
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The trial exhibits reveal clearly Ben's, or his Hisfield
Gravel Company's, ownership of the following assets prior to his
marriage to Louise:
Exhibit
Number
57d

3 Harrisville houses and 2 1/2
acres, located at 1984
Harrisville Road, acquired
from Annie Maxfield.
(Tr. 145-146).

57d

Date Acquired
By Ben

Property Description

January 4, 1944

Harrisville farm (approximately
50 acres) acquired from James E.
and Stella Harmston.

56d

June 23, 1956

50% interest in 160 acres,
conveyed to Hisfield Gravel
for development of Rolling
Hills subdivision.
(Tr. 27-28) .

lip and 23d

April 19, 1952

368 Collins acquired from
Ray Wesley and Joyce
Elaine Moss.

December 16, 1959

14p

2071 Lane, Lot 14, Block 16,
Plat lfBM , Ogden City,
distributed from Hisfield
Gravel Company to John B.
Maxfield.

September 4, 1963

15p

Lots 15, 16 and 17, Block 9,
Rolling Hills Addition No. 5,
Ogden City, distributed to
John B. Maxfield from Hisfield
Gravel Company during its
liquidation.

March 16, 1967

From six sales of property, subdivided from his Harrisville
properties, Ben received $42,000.00 in gross receipts as follows:

- 10 -
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Date
09/12/61

Exhibit
Number
57d

Parcel
Description
11-023-0002

Sales
Pr ice

Buyers
Veron E. and
Bonnie Lee Moss

$ 2,500

12/15/64

57d and lOp 11-023-0023

Douglas B. and
Patricia Eggleston

16,000

05/13/68

57d and 9p

11-023-0003

Lynn W. and
Shanna Lee Edwards

8,000

05/21/69

57d

11-023-0021

Lawrence R. and
Shirley Nye

2,500

04/04/60

57d

11-023-0011

George L. and
Karlene Knight

2,000

01/26/62

57d

11-023-0010

Grant Z. and
Annie I. Stephens
le properties

11,000
$4 2,000

From sales of his Ogden City properties, derived principally
from his investment in Hisfield Gravel Company, Ben grossed an
additional $105,850.00, bringing to $147,850.00 his total gross
receipts from sales of his debt-free premarital properties. The
only reinvestment of any portion of these funds during his
marriage to Louise was their placement in joint bank accounts with
Bank of Utah.

The following is a summary of Ben's Ogden City

property sales:
Date
03/01/60

Exhibit
Number
lip and 23d

Parcel
Description
Lot 1, Block 1,
El Rancho, Ogden
City.

- 11 -

Buyers

Sales
Price

George H. and
$ 8,000
Donna G. Eastman
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07/28/64

14p, 56d
and 18d
(1964 1040)

Part of Lot 4,
Block 16, Plat B
Ogden City,
2071 Lane

Richard and
Ethel Lou Sober

6,500

07/10/67

56d

Lot 15, Block 9,
Rolling Hills
Ogden City.

Dale W. and
Linda Stoker

4,000

04/19/68

56d

Lot 17, Block 9,
Rolling Hills,
Ogden City.

Huffman and Fiet

3,600

Lot 16, Block 9,
Rolling Hills
Ogden City.

Steve C. and
Glenda L. Packer

3,700

64.87 acres in
NE 1/4 Section
22, T6N, R1W.

Fife Equipment
& Investment Co.

80,000

11/02/70

06/01/73

56d, 15p,
and 18d
(1970 1040)
56d

Total sales of Ogden City properties

$105,850

After his marriage to Louise Ben acquired three properties
with Louise as a joint tenant at a total cost of $27,000.00. To
complete the largest of these three purchases in 1964, the Costley
property, a $16,900.00 Bank of Utah loan was obtained, adding to
the couple's previous Bank of Utah indebtedness of $5,000.00 on a
promissory note secured by Ben's separate property. (Exhibits 8p,
21d and 15p). This total indebtedness was retired from proceeds
derived from the sales of said jointly acquired properties,
totaling $43,700.00 and resulting in a gross profit of $16,700.00,
as follows:

- 12 -
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Exhibit
Number

Description

Date
Acquired

7p and
20d

Hellewell

1/26/62

8p and
2Id

Costley

2/13/64

22d

Campkin

5/8/75

Date
Sold

Purchase Sales
Buyers P r i c e
Price

4 / 2 5 / 6 2 Sevy

$4,000

Profit

$7,500

$3,500

13,400
3,700
3,500
3,600
12,000

9,200
4,000

15,000
4/22/64
11/10/64
5/22/64
8/22/67
6/3/75

Total sales of jointly
acquired property

Owen
Nielsen
Hanzlik
Owen
Bice
8,000

$27,000 $43,700 $16 ,700

On or about October 31, 1969, Louise received from her
father, William P. Arbon, a warranty deed for his residence.
According to the Maxfields1 1974 1040 income tax return Louise
apparently paid her brothers $5,000.00 from the sale proceeds for
their two-thirds interest in said property. Consequently, her
share of the sale proceeds was approximately $4,000.00. (Exhibit
18d-1973 1040).

From Louise's testimony it is fair to infer

that the deposit of her share in "Salt Lake City" was not to the
Ogden joint accounts with her husband, but to accounts kept
separate from his funds in a manner similar to her inheritance
from her aunt. (Tr. 118).
By warranty deed dated November 26, 1985, Ben and Louise, as
joint tenants, conveyed Louise's residence to Louise and her three
children as joint tenants with right of survivorship.

On that

same day Ben, individually, executed a warranty deed of his farm

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to himself and his two children as joint tenants with right of
survivorship.

Both deeds were recorded by Louise. (Exhibits 44d

and 45d) .
In summary, the trial exhibits clearly reveal, first, that
Ben received $147,850.00 in gross receipts from sales of his
separate property acquired prior to his marriage to Louise, which
funds together with his retirement annuity and social security
payments were deposited in the joint accounts at Bank of Utah;
second, that gross profits from properties acquired and sold
jointly during the marriage totalled only $16,700.00, which funds
were also deposited in the joint bank accounts at Bank of Utah;
and third, that Louise received an inheritance of $12,000.00 from
an aunt, $4,000.00 from the sale of her one-third interest in her
father's residence and monthly social security benefits, none of
which were ever deposited to the joint accounts with Ben.

The

only separate funds of Louise, that were allegedly deposited to
the joint accounts with Ben, were the less than $9,500 received by
Louise in take-home pay prior to 1972. (Tr. 16 and Exhibit 18d).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The respective interests of Ben and Louise in the joint
accounts should have been determined pursuant to the provisions of

- 14 -
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Utah Code Ann, 1953, as amended, §75-6-103(1), not by the trial
court's arbitrary determination that each spouse had contributed
one-half to the accounts,

Louise's wrongful withdrawal of all

the joint accounts destroyed the joint tenancy therein and
extinguished any right she had to survivorship in the funds which
may have existed prior to her wrongful conduct.

The true

ownership of the funds, as a matter of statutory law, should have
been determined by the amounts each spouse had contributed to the
joint accounts.
Ben's separate property, acquired prior to his marriage to
Louise, did not lose its character as separate property by being
placed in joint tenancy or being exchanged for contracts and money
which was ultimately placed in joint bank accounts with Louise.
Section 75-2-202(2)(a), Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, if
properly applied to the widow's claim in the instant case, would
expressly exclude from "marital property" Ben's premarital
property, property exchanged therefor and the increase thereto,
all of which comprised nearly all of Ben's joint accounts after
his marriage to Louise.

ARGUMENT
POINT I; THE JOINT ACCOUNTS WERE OWNED DURING THE LIFETIME
OF BEN AND LOUISE IN DIRECT PROPORTION TO THE NET CONTRIBUTION BY
EACH TO THE SUMS ON DEPOSIT.

- 15 -
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A series of cases decided by this Court from 1941 to 1974
developed the rule that a presumption of joint ownership arises
when funds are deposited in joint bank accounts while the
depositors are alive, but such presumption was rebuttable by clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary. Neill v. Royce, 101 Ut.
181, 120 P.2d 327 (1941);
P.2d 194 (1949);

Greener v. Greener, 116 Ut. 571, 212

First Security Bank of Utah v. Demiris, 10

Ut.2d 405, 354 P.2d 97 (1960);
177, 367 P.2d 177 (1961);

Braegger v. Loveland, 12 Ut.2d

Tangren v. Ingalls, 12 Ut.2d 388, 367

P.2d 179 (1961); McCullough v. Wasserback, 30 Ut.2d 398, 518 P.2d
691 (1974).

In 1975, however, this rule was supplanted by Utah

Code Ann. 1953, as amended, §75-6-103(1), which defined ownership
of joint accounts during the lifetime of the depositors to be
"...in proportion to the net contributions by each to the sums on
deposit, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a
different intent."
The trial court, although mentioning §75-6-103 (Tr. 235) f
refused to apply the statute to the instant case because of the
following erroneous view of the evidence:
Property was placed in joint tenancy. It was turned over
several times. And I find that the bulk of the property
lost its character as separate property. (Tr. 236).
This conclusion is not supported by the evidence.

The trial

exhibits, especially the income tax returns, indicate clearly that

- 16 -
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the "bulk" of the funds remained in Bank of Utah from the time of
their deposit until their wrongful withdrawal by Louise and were
never "turned over several times", (Exhibit 18d) .
Louise's separate funds, with the possible exception of some
residue of her less than $9,500 take-home pay during the first
eleven years of their marriage, were all kept separate from the
joint accounts with Ben.

Her inheritance from an aunt, her share

of the proceeds from the sale of her father's home and her social
security payments were never deposited to the joint accounts with
Ben. (Tr. 71, 118).

The "bulk" of the joint deposits was clearly

derived from sale proceeds of Ben's premarital properties, the
accrued interest thereon and his retirement and social security
benefits. (Tr. 27-31).
A safe assumption is that the $16,700 gross profit from the
sale of jointly acquired real estate was deposited to Ben's joint
accounts.

It should be noted, however, that most of that post-

marital investment in real estate was made by means of bank loans,
not savings withdrawals.

Of the $27,000 invested in said real

estate during the marriage $21,900 were derived from two bank
loans of $5,000 and $16,900.

(Exhibits 15p, 8p and 21d).

Consequently, each spouse should be deemed to have contributed to
the joint Bank of Utah accounts one-half of said profit, or
$8,350, the only sum other than the residue of her take-home pay,
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which can actually, or presumptively, be attributed to Louise as
contributions to the joint bank accounts with Ben.

The deposits

of Louise's take-home pay to the joint accounts with Ben are
really an insignificant factor when compared to Ben's greater
deposits of his annuity payments and other income through all
years of the marriage, not just eleven years thereof.
Admittedly, the bulk of the joint accounts came from real
estate sales totaling $191,550.

All of this total, except the

said joint profit of $16,700, was clearly derived from sales of
Ben's premarital real estate.

His share therefore of these total

sale proceeds can be determined by subtracting Louise's one-half
of the profit from the sales of jointly acquired realty, or
$8,350.00.

The remainder, $174,850, is clearly the amount

contributed by Ben, totalling over ninety percent of the total
sale proceeds deposited to the joint accounts.

This contributive

share of Ben was augmented by deposits of his retirement and
social security payments and accumulated interest.

On the other

hand, Louise's contribution to the same accounts, $8,350 or onehalf of the profit from the sales of jointly acquired real estate,
could not have amounted to ten percent of the funds contributed to
the joint accounts.

Consequently, if the trial court had

properly applied §75-6-103(1) in the instant case, Ben's ownership
of the joint accounts would have been at least ninety percent

- 18 -
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i

thereof, not the arbitrary fifty-fifty division ordered by the
trial court.
i

POINT II: LOUISE'S WRONGFUL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL JOINT DEPOSITS
ASSAULTED THE INTERESTS OF THE OTHER JOINT DEPOSITORS, THEREBY
DESTROYING ANY JOINT TENANCY AND EXTINGUISHING THE RIGHT OF
SURVIVORSHIP,
During the trial the court declared "...that it was wrong for
her to withdraw the entire amount of all accounts at the time and
in the manner that she did...." (Tr. 234).

The court logically

concluded that Louise "...lost the right to claim her survivorship
interest in joint accounts when she withdrew the money from those
accounts, and the character of those accounts was changed." (Tr.
233).

These statements by the trial court comport to the

generally held rule that one joint tenant cannot destroy the
interest or estate of the other. 20 AM. JUR. 2d Cotenancy and
joint Ownership §2 (1965), p. 93.

One who knowingly disposes of

the property of another has been characterized by this court as a
"conscious wrongdoer", Park v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 673 P.2d
590, at 603 (1983), and in a case not very dissimilar to the
present case has stated ,
Looking at the matter through the eyes of equity it
seems indisputable that defendant's act of grabbing the
money at the earliest opportunity was for the purpose of
getting it for herself and excluding the cotenant
therefrom; and that this was a wrongful act which should
not be rewarded.
Under such circumstances the court
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should look beyond the superficiality of the form in
which the money was held and determine the true facts as
to its ownership. First Security Bank of Utah v.
Demiris, 10 Ut.2d 405, 394 P.2d 97, at 99 (1960).
Integral to this holding is the destruction of the joint tenancy
and right of survivorship to prevent the wrongful act from being
rewarded by unjust enrichment.
It should be noted in the instant case, however, that Louise
was but one of several joint owners in most of the joint funds
wrongfully withdrawn.

Consequently, the net effect of Louise's

wrongful conduct was to open the question of true ownership of the
funds on deposit which must be determined pursuant to the
statutory requirement of looking to the respective contributions
of the codepositors as required by §75-6-103(1) .

The Editorial

Board Comment, following this code section, states,
Presumably, overwithdrawal leaves the party making the
excessive withdrawal liable to the beneficial owner as a
debtor or trustee.
For Louise to be declared the owner of one-half of all the funds
wrongfully withdrawn, regardless of her contribution thereto, is
not only unjust, but is contrary to a Utah statute designed to
protect against such misconduct —

not reward it.

The trial court erred by failing to determine the true
ownership of the funds on deposit as required by Utah law, which
error has permitted Louise to be unjustly enriched with Ben's
money, totally contrary to his expressed intention and desire.
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POINT III; PROPERTY BROUGHT INTO THE MARRIAGE BY BEN DID NOT
LOSE ITS CHARACTER AS SEPARATE PROPERTY AND BECOME MARITAL
PROPERTY BY BEING PLACED IN JOINT TENANCY THROUGH VARIOUS SALES
AND PURCHASES.
To affirm the trial court's second conclusion of law, "[T]hat
the property brought into marriage was converted to joint
ownership through various sales and purchases thereby losing its
character as separate property and becoming marital property to
which each spouse is deemed to have contributed one-half",
(Addendum 2 hereto attached) is tantamount to negating not only
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, §75-6-103(1), but also the
statutory definition of "marital property" set forth in Utah Code
Ann. 1953, as amended, §75-2-202(2)(a).

This latter 1977 code

section expressly excludes from marital property,
(ii) property acquired in exchange for property acquired
prior to the most recent marriage to the surviving
spouse... and (iii) the increase, rents, issues, and
profits on property acquired prior to the most recent
marriage to the surviving spouse....
In divorce actions property acquired before marriage, or by
inheritance or gift, has been generally considered separate
property and excluded from marital property, unless the other
spouse has augmented, maintained or protected the property, or the
parties have "inextricably commingled" the separate property with
marital property, losing thereby its separate character.

Burke v.

Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987); Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah
App. 1990).

In Burt the court stated, "Conversion from one
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investment medium to another does not, by its self, destroy the
integrity of segregation." _Id. at 1169.

Present in the instant

case, however, is no evidence that Louise did anything to augment,
maintain or protect the joint accounts.

In fact, her conduct was

to the contrary of augmenting, maintaining and protecting them.
She kept her separate funds from deposit to the accounts, made
substantial personal withdrawals therefrom without the knowledge
or consent of her husband and wasted $6,000 thereof in early
withdrawal penalties. (Tr. 52, 67-70).

Also, it is a far stretch

of imagination to conclude that funds deposited in any joint bank
account have been "inextricably commingled".
Of particular significance in the instant case is the fact
that there were no joint accounts between the spouses, Ben and
Louise, from the time Louise wrongfully attempted to convert all
the funds to her personal ownership in 1986 until the time of
Ben's death, December 3, 1989.

Louise's absolute control of the

funds in her new separate accounts continued until May 22, 1987,
when they were ordered pursuant to stipulation to be "...deposited
with Bank of Utah as special conservator of the Estate of John B.
Maxfield." (Exhibit 2p).

On two separate occasions the district

court allowed special distributions to Louise from her husband's
conservatorship for purposes other than her living expenses,
subject on both occasions to her paying back to the conservator
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the special distributions if they exceeded "the value of her
interest in the conservatorship". (Exhibits 49d and 50d).
After Ben's death Louise's objection to the probate of his
will contained a claim against his estate for "statutory spouse
allowances and marital shares". (Paragraph 13 of Addendum 4 hereto
attached).

His will poured any probate estate over to the

trustees of his inter vivos trust for distribution of $600.00 per
month to Louise for her lifetime and for distribution of the
balance of the trust estate equally to his two children. (Exhibit
43d).

After the trial court's finding that Ben's will was.valid,

Louise's claim was for an elective share under Utah Code Ann.
1953, as amended, §75-2-201, in reference to which the Editorial
Board Comment, immediately preceding said code section, is
particularly informative,
The surviving spouse rather than the executor or the
probate court has the burden of asserting an election,
as well as the burden of proving the matters which must
be shown in order to make a successful claim to more
than he or she has received.
In other words, it was Louise's burden to prove the amount, if
any, of any marital property, or augmented estate, to which she
made claim.

The statute limits "marital property" generally to

"...property acquired by the decedent subsequent to the most
recent marriage to the surviving spouse...." Utah Code Ann. 1953,
as amended, §75-2-202(2)(a).

It specifically excludes premarital
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property and property exchanged for premarital property. Ibid.
The only "marital property"

in the instant case was

comprised of the spouse's earnings from employment and the three
parcels of jointly acquired real estate which were acquired for
$27f000 and sold for $43 f 700, resulting in a joint profit of
$16,700.

One-half of this profit, $8,350, should properly be

deemed to be Louise1s contribution to marital property.

Ben's

one-half share should also be deemed marital property to which
Louise should have a valid elective share claim to one-third of
his $8,350, the other one-half interest in the marital property,
and the increase thereon.

In total dollars her claim should be

limited to $8,350 plus $2,783.33, increased by a reasonable
interest accrual from the respective dates of sale of the
Hellewell, Costley and Campkin properties, the only properties
acquired by purchase during the marriage that were not previously
owned by Ben nor received by gift or inheritance.
The trial court erred in concluding that the separate
property of the husband had become marital property by being
placed in joint tenancy and "turned over several times". (Tr.
236).

That simply did not happen in the instant case.

Of the

total sale proceeds of $191,550 received during the marriage, only
$5,100 could be deemed to have been reinvested in jointly acquired
real property.

Although the total sum invested jointly during
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t h e m a r r i a g e was $ 2 7 , 0 0 0 , $ 2 1 , 9 0 0 of s a i d

sum were d e r i v e d

from

joint bank borrowings, secured primarily by Ben's separate
properties. (Exhibits 8p, 21d and 15p).

The difference between

^

the total cost of the three jointly acquired properties, $27,000,
and the $21,900 in purchase loans, the sum of only $5,100, is all
that could possibly be deemed to have been "turned over" funds.

{

All other real estate sale proceeds were deposited to Bank of Utah
accounts and never reinvested in any medium other than renewed
saving certificates at Bank of Utah in various family names.

{

CONCLUSION
The decision of the trial court should be reversed and all

{

clearly established premarital property of Ben with its increase
should be restored to his personal representatives for
distribution pursuant to his valid last will and testament.
Dated this 13th day of March, 1991.
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW

VtilXrwr^J.
Critchlow, III
Attorneys for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that four copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANTS were mailed postage prepaid this 13th day of March,
1991, to R. Stephen Marshall, Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall &
McCarthy, 50 South Main Street, Suite 1600, P.O. Box 45340, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84145.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM 1

ORDER of District Court, dated October 11, 1990.

ADDENDUM 2

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, dated
October 11, 1990.

ADDENDUM 3

STIPULATION AND ORDER of District Court, dated May
22, 1987.

ADDENDUM 4

AMENDED OBJECTION TO APPLICATION FOR INFORMAL
PROBATE, AND PETITION FOR DETERMINATION IF THERE
ARE ASSETS COMPRISING AN ESTATE AND PETITION FOR
FORMAL PROBATE AND APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE, dated May 10, 1990.
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BRUCE W. STRATFORD, 4922
Attorney at Law
1218 First Security Bank Bldg.
Ogden, Utah, 84401
Telephone: 621-6863
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE

)

OF

)

JOHN BEN MAXFIELD

ORDER

) PROBATE NO. 893917225 ES
JUDGE:

DAVID E. ROTH

The above entitled cause came on regularly for
hearing on the 11th and 12th days of June, 1990,

Factual

determinations having been made pursuant to said hearing and
the

Court

having

entered

its

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law, now enters its Order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
the withdrawal by Louise A. Maxfield, one joint tenant, of
money from the joint accounts causes the loss of the right
to claim a survivorship interest in the joint accounts.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
the property brought into marriage was converted to joint
ownership through various sales and purchases thereby losing
its character as separate property

and becoming marital

property to which each spouse is deemed to have contributed
one-half.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
the farm property owned individually by John Ben Maxfield
prior

to the marriage and retained

as separate property

during the marriage is non-marital property, except to the
extent

that

acreage

was

added

to

the

farm

during

the

marriage.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
the residence of a Louise A. Maxfield acquired prior to the
marriage

and

retained

as

separate

property

during

the

marriage is nonmarital property,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
the

will

properly

executed

by

a John

Ben

Maxfield,

a

competent testator, under no undue influence is a valid last
will and testament.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
Louise A. Maxfield, the surviving widow is entitled to onehalf of the marital money in the Special Conservator (Trust)
Account,

subject,

however,

to

a

credit

and

charge

for

payment of attorney fees in the sum of $12,130.60, credit
and charge for home improvements in the sum of $5,299.07,
credit, and subject to a credit, and charge for th $14,139.18
withdrawn from the checking account on December 1, 1986,
offset

by

the

amounts

redeposited

with

the

Special

Conservator and the amounts used for the benefit of John Ben
Maxfield.

The early withdrawal penalties, in the sum of

$6,349.53 incurred by withdrawal of the joint accounts on
November 26, 1986 be credited to the Special Conservator
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(Trust) account and charged one half against the share of
Louise and one half agains the remaining funds passing to
Ben

J.

Maxfield

and

Joy

M.

Thornock

as

Personal

Representatives of the Estate of John Ben Maxfield,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
Ben

J,

Maxfield,

a debtor

of the estate,

and Special

Conservator (Trust) Account is required to pay the balance
owed on the loan from John Ben Maxfield to the Special
Conservator,
Dated this

//

day of

(j/Ct

1990

BY THE COURT

^/RONALD 0, HYDE
^ 0)AVID E. ROTH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Approved a s t o form:
^

^

^

£^-

Willi/rfn ^ r c r i t c h l o w , I I I
Attorney for Ben J. Maxfield and
Joy M, Thornock

S r ATEOKUTAH
}
COUNTY OF WE3ER)

~.

I Hcro^v Certify That Thir 'c A TA»Q Copy

DATED TH.^.O^Y cy..lv:s...:\sZz*

tj$n
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BRUCE W. STRATFORD, 4922
Attorney at Law
1218 First Security Bank Bldg.
Ogden, Utah, 84401
Telephone: 621-6863
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF

) FINDINGS OF FACT AND
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

JOHN BEN MAXFIELD

) PROBATE NO. 893917225 ES
JUDGE:

DAVID E. ROTH

The above entitled cause came on regularly for
hearing on the 11th and 12th days of June, 1990, on the
objection of Louise A. Maxfield, Widow of John Ben Maxfield,
deceased, with Bruce W. Stratford and Dale E. Stratford
appearing on behalf of Louise A. Maxfield, and with William
J.

Critchlow,

III and Richard

H. Thornley

appearing on

behalf of Ben J. Maxfield and Joy M. Thornock; witnesses on
behalf of the parties were sworn and examined, and evidence,
both oral and documentary, was introduced on behalf of the
respective parties, and the evidence having been duly taken
and

heard,

the

cause

was

argued

by

counsel

for

the

respective parties; and the Court now being duly advised as
to all the matters and issues involved in the proceeding,
makes

and

files

the

following

findings

of

conclusions of law:
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fact

and

FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds:
1.
joint

Louise A. Maxfield withdrew the money from

accounts

and

thereby

lost the

right

to claim a

survivorship interest in the joint accounts.
2.

The bulk of the property brought into the

marriage by John Ben Maxfield lost its character as separate
property

and

became

marital

property

to

which

each

contributed one-half (1/2).
3.

The

farm

of John

Ben

Maxfield

was his

separate, non-marital property, except to the extent that
acreage was added to
4.

the farm during the marriage.

The residence of Louise A. Maxfield is her

separate, non-marital property.
5.

John Ben Maxfield was competent at the time he

executed his Last Will and Testament.
6.

No undue influence was exerted on John Ben

Maxfield, either by his children or his attorney.
7.

The Last Will and Testament

of John Ben

Maxfield is valid and should be admitted to probate and
decedent's estate be governed by said will and the trust
which is the major beneficiary of the will.
8.

Louise A. Maxfield is entitled to one-half

(1/2) of the sums in the Special Conservator (Trust) Account
at the Bank of Utah with the following modifications:
a.

She will be charged and credited

for the

withdrawal of attorney fees, in the total sum of $12,130.60
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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b.

She will be charged and credited for amounts

for home improvements, in the total sura of $5,299*07;
c.

She will be charged

and credited

for the

$14,139.18 withdrawn from the checking account on December
1, 1986, offset by the amounts redeposited with the Special
Conservator and the amounts used for the benefit of John Ben
Maxfield.
(d)

The early withdrawal penalties in the sum of

$6,349.53 incurred by withdrawal of the joint accounts on
November 26, 1986 be credited to the special conservator
(Trust) account and charged one half against the share If
Louise and one half against the remaining funds passing to
Ben

J.

Maxfield

and

Joy

M.

Thornock

as

Personal

Representatives of the Estate of John Ben Maxfield.
9.

Ben J. Maxfield shall be required to repay to

the Special Conservator the balance due on his loan from
John Ben Maxfield. That the balance due from Ben J. Maxfield
shall be added into the Special Conservator (Trust) Account
prior to the division of the account.
10.

Ben J. Maxfield

and Joy M. Thornock are

entitled to Letters Testamentary under the Last Will and
Testament of John Ben Maxfield dated March 26, 1987.
11.

As personal representatives of said estate of

John Ben Maxfield, Deceased, Ben J. Maxfield and Joy M.
Thornock are entitled to receive all remaining funds of the
John Ben Maxfield Special Conservatorship (Trust) Account at
Bank

of Utah, after distribution

by the Conservator to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Louise A. Maxfield of her distributive share as hereinabove
described.

Which

residual

funds being

remitted

to Ben J

Maxfield and Joy M. Thornock as Personal Representatives of
said estate are to be managed and governed pursuant to the
provisions

of the Will

and

Intervivos Trust

of John Ben

Maxfield.
12.

After

making

its

final

account

and

the

distributions of the adjusted share of the conservatorship
funds

to

Louise

A.

Maxfield

and

the

remaining

balance

thereof to Ben J. Maxfield and Joy M. Thornock, as personal
representatives

of

the

deceased,

of

Utah

Bank

estate
shall

of
be

John

Ben

discharged

Maxfield,
as

special

conservator, said Conservator being entitled to its accrued
and unpaid Conservatorship fee at the time of discharge.
From

the

foregoing

FINDINGS

OF

FACT

the

Court

makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the withdrawal by Louise A. Maxfield, one

joint tenant, of money from the joint accounts causes the
loss of the right to claim a survivorship interest in the
joint accounts.
2.
converted

to

That the property brought into marriage was
joint

ownership

through

various

sales

and

purchases thereby losing its character as separate property
and becoming marital property to which each spouse is deemed
to have contributed one-half.
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3.

That the farm property owned individually by

John Ben Maxfield prior to the marriage and retained as
separate

property

during

the

marriage

is

non-marital

property, except to the extent that acreage was added to the
farm during the marriage.
4.

That the residence of a Louise A. Maxfield

acquired prior to the marriage and retained

as separate

property during the marriage is nonmarital property.
5.

That the will properly executed by a John Ben

Maxfield, a competent testator, under no undue influence is
a valid last will and testament*
6.

That Louise A. Maxfield, the surviving widow

is entitled to one-half of the marital money in the Special
Conservator (Trust) Account, subject, however, to a credit
and

charge

for payment of attorney

fees in the sum of

$12,130,60, credit and charge for home improvements in the
sura of $5,299.07, credit, and subject to a credit and charge
for th $14,139.18 withdrawn from the checking account on
December 1, 1986, offset by the amounts redeposited with the
Special Conservator and the amounts used for the benefit of
John Ben Maxfield.

The early withdrawal penalties, in the

sum

incurred

of

$6,349.53,

by withdrawal

of

the joint

accounts on November 26, 1986 be credited to the Special
Conservator (trust) account and charged one half against the
share of Louise and one half against the remaining funds
passing to Ben J. Maxfield and Joy M. Thornock as Personal
Representatives of the Estate of John Ben Maxfield.
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7. That Ben <!• Maxfield, a debtor of the estate,
and Special Conservator

(Trust) Account is required to pay

the balance owed on the loan frora John Ben Maxfield to the
Special Conservator.
Dated this

it*

day of

1990
BY THE COURT

'6,'RONALD 0 HYpc
*a

Approved as t o form:

f

DAVID E. ROTH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
STA7EOKj'. " •

rSil^gg^
Critchlow, I I I

Tnj?Ccpy

. • ^ i ^

Attorney f o r Ben J. Maxfield and
Joy M. Thornock
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HAY 2? 3ioPH.'81
WEBF..:U.'•-:{:'» CUSM
RICHARD R.Grtt£NE

William J . Critchlow, III
Richard H. Thornley
PARKER, THORNLEY fc CRITCHLOW
Attorneys for John B . Maxfield
2610 Washington Boulevard
P.O. Box 107
Ogden, Utah 84402
Telephone: 399-3303

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

h
0 <
H >

ou I ?
• « • o 2
« > Jx 5
^z j ! 3

*3 *j I

In t h e Matter of the Estate of
STIPULATION AND ORDER
JOHN B . MAXFIELD,
Civil No. 16448

8g I^ 8
of 2
UJ i

* («
c
<
a.

The above entitled matter having come on for hearing before t h e above
entitled court on the 16th day of April, 1987, t h e Honorable John F . Wahlquist,
District Court Judge, presiding.
was

represented

John B . Maxfield was personally present and

by his counsel,

William J .

Critchlow,

III and

Richard

H.

Thornley a n d Louise A. Maxfield was personally present and was represented by
h e r counsel, Bruce W. Stratford; and the said parties entered into the following
stipulation in open court:
1.

Bank

of

Utah,

Ogden t

Utah,

shall

conservator of the Estate of John B. Maxfield*
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be

appointed

special

kV^fdcd Sock 1; 2 7
Indexed

2.

All funds withdrawn by Louise A. Maxfield from joint accounts oi

John B. Maxfield, Louise A. Maxfield and others be deposited with Bank of Utah
as special conservator of the Estate of John B. Maxfield*
3,

An accounting shall be provided by the Bank of Utah and Louise

A. Maxfield for all funds not delivered to Bank of Utah as special conservator.
4*

The trust established by Louise A. Maxfield with Bank of Utah as

Trustee shall be revoked in its entirety.
5.
5
o
T

oonservator and all other funds not delivered to the special conservator but
0

u<
0 O D

which

M i o5
* " *

n >

Z w

2

;

withdrawn

or

used from the original joint accounts

shall be

determined in the divorce proceeding between John B. Maxfield and Louise A.

I

o i I oi
* ? \< 8
5P*
§
cr

were

§

•

UJ

The queston of ownership of the funds delivered to the special

Maxfield, and all other pending actions between said parties shall be merged in
the divorce proceeding.
6*

Bank of Utah, as special conservator, shall distribute such sums

as it shall deem reasonable and proper for the living expenses of John B.
Maxfield and Louise A. Maxfield until final determination by the court in the
divorce proceedings.
1.

John B. Maxfield requires some type of nursing home care which

is to be determined by a letter of recommendation from O. Marvin Lewis.
8*

The care of John B. Maxfield and Louise A. Maxfield is of

paramount concern and no children or heirs of either party shall in any way
dispose of any asset of either John B. Maxfield or Louise A. Maxfield.
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DATED this / / " day of i^dtt, 1987.

John B. Maxfield

S-'f-*7

Xouise A. Max
Approved as to form:

2-

Si
.S3
1

O

$-5'Z7

<%'6'-*~7WilliatrJ. Critchlow, III

<r//sAy

A
^
/t^4^/
Bruc^e W. Stratford

Vs/s?

°i
ORDER

\ a i o«

*2
*

K

ft

Pursuant to the foregoing stipulation and with good cause appearing

<

If? §

therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Bank

of

Utah,

Ogden,

Utah,

is

hereby

appointed

special

conservator of the Estate of John B. Maxfield.
2.

All funds withdrawn by Louise A. Maxfield from joint accounts of

John B. Maxfield, Louise A. Maxfield and others shall be deposited with Bank of
Utah as special conservator of the Estate of John B. Maxfield.
3.

An accounting shall be provided by the Bank of Utah and Louise

A. Maxfield for all funds not delivered to Bank of Utah as special conservator.
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4.

The trust established by Louise A. Maxfield with Bank of Utah as

Trustee is hereby revoked in its entirety.
5.

The question of ownership of the funds delivered to the special

oonservator and all other funds not delivered to the special conservator but
which

were

withdrawn

or

used

from

the

original

joint

accounts

shall

be

determined in the divorce proceeding between John B. Maxfield and Louise A.
Maxfield, and all other pending actions between said parties shall be merged in
the divorce proceeding.
5
o
I °
*

C

6.

Bank of Utah, as special conservator, shall distribute such sums

O <

as it shall deem reasonable and

H

>

Maxfield and Louise A. Maxfield until final determination by the court in the

8 0 «D

divorce proceedings*

• *

proper for the living

expenses of John B.

o > z w i

E3*J|
o 1 1 o- i
of 2
u «
* «

7.

The care facility for John B. Maxfield shall be determined by a

letter of recommendation from 0. Marvin Lewis.

X

2

8.

That the care of John B. Maxfield and Louise A. Maxfield is of

paramount ooncern and no children or heirs of either party shall in any way
dispose of any asset of either John B. Maxfield or Louise A. Maxfield,
A?*
Dated this

John F. Wahlquist
DISTRICT JUDGE
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BRUCE W. STRATFORD, No. 4922
Attorney at Law
1218 First Security Bank Bdg.
Ogden, Utah, 84401
Telephone: 393-7085
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
A M E N D E D
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF

) OBJECTION TO APPLICATION
) FOR INFORMAL PROBATE, AND

JOHN BEN MAXFIELD,

) PETITION FOR DETERMINATION

Deceased

) IF THERE ARE ASSETS
) COMPRISING AN ESTATE AND
PETITION FOR FORMAL PROBATE
AND APPOINTMENT OF
) PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
)

Probate No. 893917225ES

Petitioner, LOUISE A. MAXFIELD, by and through her
attorney,

BRUCE

W.

STRATFORD,

hereby

amends

the

prior

Objection to Application for Informal Probate as follows:
1.

That

pursuant

to

discovery

entered

into

concerning the affairs and/or property of the decedent, the
following assets have been set forth as those in which the
decedent had an ownership or equitable interest prior to his
death.
(a)

A farm, located in Harrisville, Weber County,

Utah, which has an approximately value set by the Weber
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Addendum 4

County Assessor of $147,000.00, and various machinery and/or
a small farm operating fund.
(b) Monies in a special Conservatorship at the Bank
of Utah.
2.

That the above named assets are treated by non

probate transfer provisions of the Utah Code and that a
determination needs to be made if such non probate transfers
are valid and effective, as against the estate, and if there
is an estate to be probated prior to the determination of
the validity of the purported Will and purported Trust which
are being admitted to formal
3.

probate.

That there were no other assets identified which

would comprise an estate and if there is no estate, that a
petition for informal and formal probate be denied.
4.

That if a determination exists that there is an

estate to be probated, petitioner restates the following:
1.

Petitioners interest in this matter is that of

the surviving spouse of the decedent.
2.

The

decedent,

John

Ben

Maxfield,

died

on

December 3, 1989 at the age of 79 years.
3.

Venue is proper because at the time of the death

the decedent was domiciled in this County.
4.

That the names and addresses of the surviving

spouse, children, heirs and devisees of the decedent, are:
NAME

ADDRESS

LOUISE A. MAXFIELD

474 16th Street
Ogden, Utah, 84404

RELATIONSHIP
Surviving spouse
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BEN J. MAXFIELD

1027 N. Harrisville Rd.
Harrisville, Utah, 84404
623 East 3450 North
North Ogden, Utah, 84404

JOY M. THORNOCK
5.

Son
Daughter

Petitioner objects to an informal appointment of

personal representative and to an informal probate of the
estate and requests that formal appointment of a personal
representative and formal probate of the estate be granted.
6.

Petitioner

is

aware

of

the

filing

of

the

Informal Probate and Petitioner hereby makes formal demand
for

notice

of

any

probate

or

appointment

proceedings

concerning the decedent that may be filed in this State or
elsewhere

by

the

parties

filing

the

aforesaid

Informal

Probate.
7.

That the time limit for formal probate has not

expired because less than three years have passed since the
decedent's death.
8.
document

The Petitioner acknowledges the existence of a

purported

to be a Will

dated March

27, 1987,

however, Petitioner requests that such Will be admitted to
formal probate for determination as to its validity.
9.

Petitioner

further

asks

that

the

purported

revocable living trust which is referenced in the Will be
admitted to Probate for a determination of its validity.
10.
probate

as

Petitioner
the

estate

further
involves

objects
a

prior

to

an

Court

informal
ordered

Conservatorship in Case No. 09877, which case was heard in
the aforesaid court on or about the 25th day of January,
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1989, and which should be referenced to the Probate action
in the event consideration is given to any testamentary
documents whatsoever.
11.

That the Petitioner seeks formal appointment as

the Personal Representative of the Estate in that she is
entitled to be said Personal Representative pursuant to
Section 75-3-203.1(b)
12.
informal

That Petitioner requests that any filings for

probate

Representative

be

or

informal

considered

appointment
adverse

of

filings

Personal
to

the

Petitioner and that all legal fees and expenses incurred as
a result of such filings be paid for by the parties so
filing and not out of the estate.
13.

Petitioner

determination

further

be made of marital

petitions
property

that

a

and/or other

properties which would be subject to the statutory spouse
allowances and marital shares.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests as follows:
1.

That a determination be made if there are assets

comprising an estate of John Ben Maxfield.
2.

That if there are no assets, the application for

informal probate and formal probate be denied.
3.
informal

That if there are assets that no action of
probate

or

appointment

of

Informal

Personal

Representative be issued.
4.

That formal probate and formal appointment of

Personal Representative occur in the above entitled estate.
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5.

That

Petitioner

be

appointed

Personal

Representative of the estate.
6.

Upon qualification and acceptance of the formal

probate that Letters Testamentary be issued.
7.

That each and every party bear their own costs

of Court and attorney fees.
8.
and/or

That a determination be made of marital property

other

properties

which

would

be

subject

to

statutory spouse allowances and marital shares.
DATED this

/£ ^

day of May, 1990.

, - y r

' < /

BRUCE to. StRATFOI
Attorney for Petitioner
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